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Screen semi materials consumables subsystems
Date: 2026-07-29 · Scout/Screener · US-listed only Field: wafer-fab consumables (filtration, CMP slurries/pads, specialty chemistries, wafer handling), subsystems (RF power, gas/vacuum), advanced-packaging materials. Coverage note: first time this layer has been screened as a field. Entegris had 0 prior mentions in the library, MKS 1.
1. The thesis, tested
Claim: materials/consumables sell per-wafer-started, so revenue tracks wafer VOLUME and process COMPLEXITY rather than fab CAPEX — making the layer more annuity-like and less peak-cyclical than semi-cap equipment.
Verdict: the thesis is TRUE about the industry — and did not translate into a good entry.
Evidence FOR (industry level) — confirmed:
| 2023 downturn | Revenue change |
|---|---|
| Global semiconductor materials | −8.2% to $66.7B (from $72.7B record) |
| — wafer fab materials | −7.0% to $41.5B |
| — packaging materials | −10.1% to $25.2B |
| Global wafer fab equipment | −18.8% to $76.4B |
Materials fell 2.3x less than WFE in the last real downturn. (SEMI, 2024-05; SEMI equipment forecast). The structural argument is real: at <7nm a wafer takes 30–40 CMP steps vs 15–20 at mature nodes, so consumable value per wafer rises with node complexity independent of tool purchases (JEES / CMP materials outlook 2025-2030).
Evidence AGAINST (company level) — the thing that kills it:
Every US-listed name in this layer has produced essentially zero revenue growth over three years:
| Ticker | Revenue 2022 → 2025 | 3yr CAGR | 3yr FCF CAGR |
|---|---|---|---|
| ENTG | $3.28B → $3.20B | −0.9% | n/a (2022 FCF negative) |
| Q | $4.75B → $4.75B | −0.0% | +1.3% |
| ESI | $2.55B → $2.55B | 0.0% | −2.8% |
| MKSI | $3.55B → $3.93B | +3.5% | +10.8% |
The layer delivered stability without growth. Lower amplitude on the downside also meant no participation on the upside — revenue in 2025 is exactly where it was in 2022. An annuity that does not grow is a bond, and none of these trades at a bond price.
2. The central test — valuation vs each name's OWN historical band
This is where today's ATE sweep found 11 of 11 names above their own bands. This field is genuinely different — but only on one of two measures, and it is the weaker measure.
| Ticker | Fwd P/E | 10y P/E median (band) | vs band | EV/EBITDA | EV/EBITDA median (band) | vs band |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ENTG | 24.9 | 45.3 (16.3–99.0) | bottom quartile | 22.3 | 16.6 (7.9–34.9, 10y) | above median, mid-band |
| Q | 26.6 | — no history — | untestable | 20.6 | — no history — | untestable |
| MKSI | 19.1 | ~23.7 (9.0–42.8) | mid-band | 22.5 | 11.9 (~9–20.9, 10y) | ABOVE 10y MAX |
| ESI | 17.2 | 31.6 (23.9–59.1) | below decade low — but see §6: ESI is under acquisition, multiple is meaningless | 18.5 | 15.2 (12.4–21.3, 5y) | above median, within |
| MTRN | 27.4 | 32.6 (20.9–85.3) | mid-low | 23.8 | 17.3 (13.2–22.0, 5y) | above 5y max |
| CBT | 12.5 | 15.4 (8.9–21.8) | lower-middle | 7.8 | 8.7 (~6.5–20.6, 10y) | below median |
| ROG | 27.5 | 43.4 (19.2–72.6) | lower third | 14.5 | ~20 (11.6–31.6, 5y) | below median |
The trap in this table. Forward P/E flatters every name here because the sell-side models a large 2026–27 earnings recovery. Check it against actual current earnings:
- ENTG Q1'26 EPS $0.60 → annualised $2.40 → 49x on today's $117.11. The 24.9x forward multiple requires EPS to roughly double.
- EV/EBITDA uses realised trailing EBITDA and needs no such assumption. On that measure ENTG is 22.3x against a 16.6x median, MKSI is above its entire 10-year range, and MTRN is above its 5-year range.
Read: where the two measures disagree, weight EV/EBITDA. It says the field is expensive — richer than its own history — and the "cheap forward P/E" is a forecast, not a price.
Data gap flagged: roic.ai free tier returns only 2 fiscal years, so the 10-year bands come from wisesheets/stockanalysis/GuruFocus (fetched 2026-07-30) and are fiscal-year-end snapshots, not annual averages — true averages would be somewhat smoother. 10-year EV/EBITDA was unobtainable for ESI, MTRN, ROG (5-year shown, flagged).
And the "crash" is not a crash
| Ticker | Price | % off 52w high | % off 52w low |
|---|---|---|---|
| ENTG | 117.11 | −37.4% | +72.3% |
| Q | 130.52 | −26.4% | +85.1% |
| MKSI | 293.30 | −34.5% | +231.4% |
| ESI | 35.62 | −27.7% | +57.4% |
| MTRN | 208.11 | −30.4% | +108.1% |
| ROG | 122.14 | −27.7% | +99.7% |
| AEIS | 274.26 | −31.0% | +113.6% |
| UCTT | 83.23 | −42.3% | +291.1% |
| ICHR | 74.97 | −34.0% | +471.4% |
| AXTI | 46.94 | −67.2% | +2,437% |
Same shape as the ATE sweep: a pullback from a parabolic run, not a de-rating to value. Q is up 73% YTD even after the selloff.
2b. Consumable vs capital revenue mix — the whole thesis, quantified
This is the test that separates the field. Higher recurring per-wafer % = better and more defensible.
| Ticker | Recurring / per-wafer consumable | Lumpy capital / tool | Semi % of total revenue | Volume-levered or capex-levered? |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| ENTG | ~75–80% unit-driven | ~25% capex-tied (⅔ fab construction, ⅓ WFE) | ~100% | Volume. The only true per-wafer annuity in the field. |
| Q | Consumables/chemistry sit inside SemiTech (55% of revenue); ICS (45%) is advanced-packaging/thermal materials | — | ~55% "Semiconductor Technologies" | Mixed, and drifting to capex. ICS grew +25% vs SemiTech +12% in Q1'26; management guides ICS to keep outgrowing. The growth engine is AI packaging. |
| MKSI | ~40% consumables + service (aftermarket parts/recalibration/service ≈30–35%) | ~60% equipment/subsystems | 43% | Capex. Least consumable-levered and least semi-exposed. |
| ESI | Electronics = 73% of revenue across Assembly / Circuitry / Semiconductor verticals | — | Semiconductor Solutions is one of three electronics verticals | Mixed — largely general electronics chemistry, not leading-edge wafer fab. |
Read: the thesis only genuinely applies to ENTG. Q is half a packaging-materials company, MKSI is 60% capital equipment and less than half semiconductor, and ESI's semiconductor vertical is a minority of a minority. The layer is far less of a uniform "razor-blade annuity" than its framing suggests — and the one name that is a true annuity (ENTG) is the one whose revenue shrank 0.9%/yr for three years.
Sources: Entegris Q1 2026; Qnity Q1 2026 10-Q; MKS Q1 2026; Element Solutions Q2 2026 10-Q. All accessed 2026-07-30.
3. §2 Moat — the moat is real, and it has been capitalised away
The named moat is genuine: qualification lock-in + efficient scale. A slurry, filter or wet chemistry qualified into a customer's process recipe cannot be swapped mid-node — requalification costs months of engineering and risks yield on a running line. Combined with the fact that consumables are a low single-digit % of wafer cost but carry 100% of yield risk, incumbents hold real pricing power. Efficient scale reinforces it: the qualified supplier list per chemistry is 2–4 names globally.
Where it resets: at node transitions. A new node re-opens the qualification, which is precisely when share moves. That makes the lock-in strong within a node and contestable between nodes — a real but periodically renewed moat, not a permanent one.
The problem — it does not show up in returns:
| Ticker | ROIC 2025 | ROIC 2024 | Gross margin | Goodwill / assets |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| ENTG | 11.0% | 6.1% | 44.4% (46.9% Q1'26, rising) | 47% |
| MKSI | 7.7% | n/a | 46.7% (from 47.6%, falling) | 29% + $2.07B intangibles → tangible book −$1.82B |
| Q | 6.8% | 6.1% | 46.2% (47.0% Q1'26, stable) | 53% |
| ESI | 5.7% | 6.7% (falling) | 42.0% (flat) | 44% |
Gross margins are healthy (42–47%) — the product-level moat is visible there. But ROIC of 5.7–11.0% is at or below cost of capital across the entire field. The reason is uniform: every one of these companies is a roll-up. ENTG paid $6.5B for CMC Materials, MKS paid $4.47B for Atotech (and wrote off ~$1.8B of it in 2023 — a −$27.54 EPS year), Q is a DuPont carve-out with $7.52B of allocated goodwill. The economics of the moat accrued to the sellers of these businesses, not to today's shareholders.
This is the single most important finding in the screen. A moat you paid full price for is not a moat you own.
4. Leverage — the field's other structural problem
| Ticker | Net debt | Net debt/EBITDA | EBIT/interest | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Q | $3.12B | 2.1x | 4.6x | cleanest; $4.03B raised at spin |
| ESI | ~$1.01B | 2.1x | ~6.4x | cleanest of the legacy names |
| ENTG | ~$3.44B | 3.9x | 2.9x | coverage is tight for a cyclical |
| MKSI | $3.48B | 3.8x | ~2.5x | $1.398B current debt vs $569M cash — refinancing event inside 12 months; tangible book −$1.82B |
MKS has paid net debt down from $3.80B (Q1'25) to $3.48B (Q1'26) — real progress — but the Atotech load still leaves negative tangible equity and a near-term maturity wall. ENTG's 2.9x interest coverage is thin for a business whose revenue just went sideways for three years.
Data gap: Yahoo's reported EV disagrees with cap + debt − cash by −$1.65B (ENTG), −$2.46B (MKSI), +$0.73B (ESI), −$0.66B (Q) — mixed reporting periods. Treat EV/EBITDA figures as ±10%.
Data-quality catch: Yahoo and roic.ai both report ENTG FY2025 operating margin at 28.9% and EBITDA margin at 41.1%. Both are wrong — corrupted by a mis-mapped Q4'25 that shows negative operating expense alongside a −$468.7M special charge. ENTG's actual quarterly operating income runs $106–142M on ~$800M revenue = 13–17% operating margin. Use ~$890M annual EBITDA, not the implied $1.31B.
5. Names screened out
| Ticker | Why cut |
|---|---|
| ICHR / UCTT | Today's ATE flag stands and is confirmed, not overturned. Gross margins of 12% and 16% — these are contract manufacturers of gas panels and subassemblies, not consumables. Both loss-making (EPS −1.48, −4.29). ICHR +471% off its low, UCTT +291%. Pure capex leverage with no qualification moat. Avoid. |
| AEIS | 7/13 verdict ("great business, wait at 36x") is unchanged by the crash. Still 22.3x forward and 32.5x EV/EBITDA — the highest in the field. Explicitly re-checked; nothing material improved. |
| AXTI | 32x sales, 21% gross margin, loss-making, +2,437% off its low. Speculative mania. Not investable. |
| MTRN | 16% gross margin — a metals converter, not a materials-moat business. EV/EBITDA above its 5-year max. |
| ROG | ROE 3%, trailing P/E at its 10-year high on collapsed earnings. Mostly EV/ADAS/wireless laminates, not wafer-fab. |
| CBT | The only genuinely cheap name on its own history (7.8x EV/EBITDA, below median; 12.5x forward). But it is a carbon-black company — semi/fumed-silica CMP exposure is a minor segment. Cheap, but not a member of this field. Worth a separate look as a value name, not as a semis play. |
| LIN / APD | Semi mix immaterial to the whole (APD 22.1x EV/EBITDA with a hydrogen-capex problem). Not this field. |
| SOLS (Solstice, Honeywell spin) | Cheapest EV/EBITDA with any semi exposure (11.7x) but primarily refrigerants, D/E 165%, and now acquiring ESI for $14.5B. Not cut for quality — flagged as the one un-stretched multiple adjacent to this field. See the ESI note in §6. |
| Photoresist / silicon wafers | Structural finding: there is no US-listed pure play. Shin-Etsu, JSR, TOK, SUMCO, Siltronic, GlobalWafers are all Japanese/European. CMC Materials and Versum were both acquired (into ENTG and Merck KGaA). The investable US set for this layer is genuinely only ENTG, Q, MKSI, ESI. |
6. Top 3
#1 — Q · Qnity Electronics · $27.3B · $130.52 · −26.4% off high, +85.1% off low
Pure-play electronics materials, spun out of DuPont 2025-11-01 (NYSE: Q, S&P 500). ~two-thirds semiconductor, incl. CMP consumables and advanced-packaging/organic-interposer materials.
| P/E ttm / fwd | 42.0 / 26.6 — no historical band exists |
| EV/EBITDA | 20.6 |
| FCF (2025) / yield | $988M / 3.6% — best in field |
| Revenue trajectory | $1,118M → $1,170 → $1,276 → $1,190 → $1,315M (Q1'26, +17.6% YoY) |
| 3yr revenue / FCF CAGR | −0.0% / +1.3% |
| Margins | GM 46.2%, op 23% (best in field), net 13% |
| ROIC / ROE | 6.8% / 7.8% |
| Debt/assets, net debt/EBITDA | 28.6%, 2.1x; coverage 4.6x |
Moat: qualification lock-in in CMP and packaging materials, plus efficient scale — DuPont's electronics franchise is a top-3 qualified supplier across several chemistries. Genuine.
Bear case (adversarial): (a) The earnings are flattered. Pre-spin quarters carried near-zero interest expense (Q1'25: $0). Standalone, interest runs ~$244M/yr. Normalising 2025 net income for that gives ~$558M, i.e. ~49x standalone P/E, not 42x. (b) 53% of assets are carve-out goodwill — ROIC of 6.8% is below cost of capital. (c) Three quarters of standalone operating history; no cycle has been observed, no band exists to test against, and the Nov-2025 lock-up/index-flow dynamics still distort the tape. (d) Up 73% YTD; sell-side is already writing "fully valued after raised outlook" (Simply Wall St, 2026-07-13). (e) Advanced packaging is where its growth is — which is AI capex, not wafer volume.
Fair value / entry: Graham IV $48.99 (of limited use — goodwill-heavy balance sheet). On ~$1.5B EBITDA, a 14–16x EV/EBITDA (fair for a 46% GM materials franchise at 2.1x leverage) gives EV $21–24B → equity ~$18–21B → $86–100/share. Entry zone $90–100. Today's $130.52 is ~30% above it. Conviction 5/10 — best business in the field, wrong price, and no history to price it against.
#2 — ENTG · Entegris · $17.8B · $117.11 · −37.4% off high, +72.3% off low
The purest expression of the thesis: ~75–80% of revenue is unit-driven (tracks wafer starts, not capex); ~25% is capex-tied, split ~2/3 fab construction, 1/3 WFE. Q1'26 unit-driven revenue +7% YoY on strength in liquid filtration, advanced deposition and selective etch (Entegris Q1 2026 results).
| P/E ttm / fwd | 67.7 / 24.9 (bottom quartile of 10y band 16.3–99.0) |
| EV/EBITDA | 22.3 vs 10y median 16.6 |
| FCF (2025) / yield | $396M / 2.2% (P/FCF 45x) |
| Revenue trajectory | 3yr CAGR −0.9%; Q1'26 $811.9M, +5.0% YoY but down sequentially |
| Margins | GM 46.9% and rising; true op margin 13–17% (see data-quality note) |
| ROIC / ROE | 11.0% (best in field) / 6.2% |
| Debt/assets, net debt/EBITDA | 45.5%, 3.9x; coverage 2.9x |
Moat: the strongest and most clearly named in the field — filtration and wet chemistries qualified into process recipes, with ENTG a required supplier on multiple leading-edge flows. Rising gross margin (46.1% → 46.9% YoY) is consistent with intact pricing power.
Bear case: (a) Revenue has shrunk over three years while the thesis predicted annuity growth — the volume story has not shown up in the P&L. (b) The 24.9x forward multiple embeds a doubling of EPS from the $2.40 Q1'26 run-rate; on realised earnings it trades at 49x. (c) 3.9x leverage with 2.9x interest coverage is thin for a cyclical. (d) Goodwill is 47% of assets from the CMC deal; ROIC only recovered to 11% in 2025 after 6.1% in 2024. (e) Reports Q2'26 next week — a binary event directly in front of any entry.
Fair value / entry: on ~$890M normalised EBITDA at 15–17x (its own 10y median area) → EV $13.4–15.1B → equity ~$10–11.7B → $66–77/share. That is below the 52-week low of $67.97, which tells you how far today's price sits from its own historical norm. A more generous 18–19x gives $83–90. Entry zone $75–90. Conviction 5/10 — best moat, best ROIC, worst growth record, and priced for a recovery that has not started.
#3 — MKSI · MKS Inc. · $19.8B · $293.30 · −34.5% off high, +231.4% off low — ranked third, rated AVOID
Third by size and relevance, but there is no honest case for it as a buy. Included with full data because it is one of only four real members of the field.
| P/E ttm / fwd | 61.2 (above 10y max of 42.8) / 19.1 |
| EV/EBITDA | 22.5 — above its entire 10-year range (max 20.9) |
| FCF (2025) / yield | $497M / 2.5% (P/FCF 40x) |
| Revenue 3yr CAGR / FCF CAGR | +3.5% (best in field) / +10.8% |
| Margins | GM 46.7%, down from 47.6% |
| ROIC / ROE | 7.7% / 11.7% |
| Recurring mix | ~40% consumables+service; semi only 43% of revenue |
| Leverage | net debt $3.48B, 3.8x EBITDA, coverage ~2.5x |
| Balance sheet | tangible book −$1.82B; $1.398B current debt vs $569M cash |
Moat: weakest of the four. RF power and vacuum subsystems compete against Advanced Energy and captive designs; the Atotech chemistry arm has genuine plating lock-in, but it is a minority of a 43%-semiconductor business.
Bear case: the 2022 Atotech deal at $4.47B produced a −$1.84B write-off in 2023 (EPS −$27.54) and left the company with negative tangible equity. Net debt has come down from $3.80B to $3.48B over the past year — real progress — but $1.4B falls due inside twelve months against $569M of cash, into a cycle that has not yet inflected. On the one valuation measure that does not require forecasting a recovery, it trades above its entire decade range.
Fair value / entry: ~$911M EBITDA at 11–13x (its own 10y median 11.9x) → EV $10.0–11.8B → equity $6.5–8.3B → $97–124/share. Today's $293.30 is roughly 2.5x that. Conviction 2/10 — avoid.
⚠️ ESI · Element Solutions — DISQUALIFIED: it is being acquired
ESI was the most interesting name on screen — forward P/E 17.2, below its lowest positive year in a decade — and that number is now meaningless.
On 2026-07-06, Solstice Advanced Materials (SOLS) agreed to acquire Element Solutions in a cash-and-stock deal valued at ~$14.5B including net debt. ESI holders receive $10.00 cash + 0.500 SOLS shares — implied ~$50.10 at announcement, a ~15% premium to the 2 July close. ESI holders would own ~44% of the combined company; close expected 1H 2027 subject to both shareholder votes and regulatory approval (Solstice/ESI press release, 2026-07-06; C&EN, 2026-07; SEC Form 425).
What this means: buying ESI today is not a semiconductor-materials investment — it is a merger-arb position that is ~72% a bet on SOLS. At SOLS $57.39 the terms are worth $10.00 + $28.70 = $38.70; ESI at $35.62 sits at an ~8.6% discount, compensation for ~9–12 months of deal, vote and regulatory risk. ESI's fall from its $49.25 high is mostly SOLS falling (SOLS is −36.8% off its own high), not ESI fundamentals.
It also retroactively explains two things the screen flagged: the 56% "revenue growth" was acquisition-driven (Micromax), not organic; and the 9.3% drop after a record-Q2 beat-and-raise on 2026-07-28 was the deal spread moving, not an earnings verdict.
Verdict: out of scope for this screen. If the user wants merger arb, that is a different framework (§6-adjacent, event-driven) and a different conversation. Underlying business quality was in any case the weakest of the four — ROIC 5.7% and falling, FCF CAGR −2.8%.
Watch instead: SOLS (Solstice Advanced Materials). Honeywell's 2025 advanced-materials spin, currently 11.7x EV/EBITDA — the cheapest EV/EBITDA of anything touching this field — becoming a ~$6.8B-revenue platform with a 26% adjusted-EBITDA margin including synergies. It is primarily refrigerants, D/E is 165%, and it is now digesting a $14.5B deal, so it is not a clean semis play. But it is the one genuinely un-stretched multiple adjacent to this layer and deserves its own look.
7. Diversification check
A portfolio-specific passage was removed from the public build.
Factor: partially additive, and this is the field's single best argument. The portfolio is saturated with AI-capex correlation (ANET, MSFT, META, GOOGL, QQQ ×2, plus SMR and LEU as datacenter-power derivatives). An equipment name would double down on that. A volume-driven consumables name is genuinely less capex-correlated — that is the diversification case.
But: the growth each of these names is actually being priced for is advanced packaging and HBM — which is AI capex wearing a consumables costume. The mix table in §2b makes this concrete: Q's faster-growing half is Interconnect Solutions (+25% vs +12%), i.e. AI packaging and thermal materials, and management guides that gap to widen. ESI's raise was "on AI electronics strength." MKSI is 60% capital equipment.
The diversification benefit is therefore much smaller than the thesis implies. Only ENTG's ~75–80% unit-driven base is a true volume annuity uncorrelated with the AI-capex cluster — and that is precisely the name whose revenue shrank 0.9%/yr for three years. The portfolio would get real diversification only from the one name with no growth, and AI-capex duplication from the ones that are growing. That trade-off is the honest summary of this field's value to this portfolio.
8. Verdict on the field
The thesis is right about the industry, wrong about the stocks, and the investable set is smaller than it looks. That is a different failure from the ATE sweep, and worth stating precisely:
- ATE failed on price alone — good businesses, every one above its own band.
- Materials fails on four counts: 1. The layer's genuine cyclical resilience (−8.2% vs −18.8% in 2023) came bundled with zero growth — every name's revenue is flat over three years. 2. The real product-level moat has been capitalised away by roll-up M&A, leaving ROIC of 5.7–11.0% against gross margins of 42–47%. Great products, mediocre owner economics. 3. The "razor-blade annuity" barely exists as a listed asset. Only ENTG is genuinely per-wafer (75–80% unit-driven). MKSI is 40% recurring and 43% semiconductor; Q's growth engine is AI packaging; ESI is mostly general electronics chemistry. The clean expression of this thesis — photoresists and silicon wafers — has no US-listed pure play at all (Shin-Etsu, JSR, TOK, SUMCO, Siltronic, GlobalWafers), and the two US names that did exist, CMC Materials and Versum, were both acquired. 4. The field is consolidating away underneath the screen. ESI is under acquisition as of 2026-07-06. The set is now effectively three names.
On valuation the field is not uniformly above its own band the way ATE was — ENTG genuinely screens in the bottom quartile of its 10-year forward P/E range. But that is the soft measure: those forward multiples assume an earnings recovery that has not begun (ENTG trades at 49x its actual Q1'26 run-rate, against a 24.9x forward that requires EPS to double). On EV/EBITDA, which uses realised earnings and needs no forecast, the field is above its own medians across the board, with MKSI above its entire 10-year range.
Add tight leverage (ENTG 2.9x interest coverage; MKSI with negative tangible book and a $1.4B maturity inside 12 months) and every name sitting 57–231% above its 52-week low, and the honest answer is:
No gems. Nothing here is a buy at today's prices. The genuine discovery is that this layer exists as an investable US-listed set at all — and that it is smaller and less pure than the thesis assumes: three names after ESI's takeout, only one of which (ENTG) is a true per-wafer annuity. Unlike ATE these businesses do have real recurring revenue and a nameable moat, so the field is worth watching. They are simply priced for the recovery, not for the wait.
MKSI is the clearest avoid — above its 10-year EV/EBITDA maximum, negative tangible equity, and a near-term refinancing wall.
Two things would change this verdict: ENTG at $75–90 (its own historical EV/EBITDA median on normalised EBITDA), or evidence in the next two prints that unit-driven revenue is actually inflecting rather than drifting at +5–7%. Both are worth waiting for; neither is present today.
Single name most worth a full /analyze: Q (Qnity Electronics)
Not because it is cheap — it is not — but because it is the highest-quality business in the layer (23% operating margin, 2.1x leverage, +17.6% YoY revenue, best FCF yield) and it is structurally un-analysable from a screen: three quarters of standalone history, no valuation band, carve-out accounting, and pre-spin earnings that understate the standalone interest burden by ~$180M/yr. Those are exactly the questions a full pipeline should resolve. Watch it toward $90–100.
Watchlist suggestion: - ENTG → 👀 On Deck, sleeve ⚡ AI & Infrastructure Capex (though it is the least AI-capex-correlated name found in this sweep — 75–80% unit-driven — which is exactly its appeal against a saturated portfolio). Entry $75–90. Break trigger: unit-driven revenue growth falling below +5% YoY, or interest coverage below 2.5x. - Q → 👀 On Deck, sleeve ⚡ AI & Infrastructure Capex. Entry $90–100. Break trigger: ICS growth converging with SemiTech (would confirm the AI-packaging engine stalling), or net debt/EBITDA above 3x. - SOLS → 📋 Honorable Mention pending its own look — 11.7x EV/EBITDA, but a refrigerants business digesting a $14.5B deal. - No adds to ⭐ Shortlist. Nothing in this field is in zone.
Data gaps & caveats
- roic.ai free tier returns only 2 fiscal years — 10-year bands sourced from wisesheets/stockanalysis/GuruFocus (fetched 2026-07-30) and are fiscal-year-end snapshots, not annual averages.
- 10-year EV/EBITDA unavailable for ESI, MTRN, ROG — 5-year bands used and flagged as such.
- Q has no historical valuation band (spun 2025-11-01). The central test is genuinely untestable for the field's best business — a material limitation on the #1 ranking.
- ENTG FY2025 operating/EBITDA margin is corrupted in both Yahoo and roic.ai (see §4). Quarterly data used instead.
- Reported EV disagrees with cap + debt − cash by −$1.65B (ENTG), −$2.46B (MKSI), +$0.73B (ESI), −$0.66B (Q). EV/EBITDA ±10%.
- ENTG and Q both report Q2'26 within days — all figures pre-date those prints.
fin.pyprovides ~4 annual periods; 5–8yr CAGRs required by §1 could not be computed at full depth for any name. 3-year CAGRs used throughout and labelled.- ESI's headline "+56% revenue growth" is acquisition-driven (Micromax), not organic — organic electronics growth was ~20%. Any screen using that figure at face value would be misled.
- Consumable-mix percentages in §2b come from management commentary and sell-side summaries rather than a segment-level 10-K reconciliation; ENTG's 75–80% is management's own framing and is the best-attested. MKSI's 40% is a sell-side estimate and should be treated as approximate.
/analyzeon Q should wait until after its Q2'26 print and should specifically reconstruct standalone pro-forma earnings — the pre-spin quarters carry near-zero interest expense and materially overstate historical profitability.