Playbook心得
What the method has learned, as opposed to what it has reported. Each note states one claim and declares how fast it goes stale.这里记录的是方法本身学到的经验,而不是它给出的报告。每一条只讲一个结论,并标明它多快会过时。
Market1
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Market regime — the 2026 two-act rout
2026 ran two sequential, opposite routs — software crashed in March on AI-displacement fear while AI-capex names ran up, then AI-capex crashed in July — so "tech is down" is never a usable statement without naming which act and which layer.
Playbook127
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"Asset-light" describes the balance sheet, not the returns — the question is whether the company retained the divested economics or distributed them
Two companies can execute the identical asset-light strategy and get opposite results, because "asset-light" only says the asset left the balance sheet — it says nothing about where the profit on that asset went.
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"Down a lot" is not "cheap"
Measure valuation against a name's own historical multiple band, never against its 52-week high — a stock can be 40% off its high and still trade above every multiple it has ever sustained.
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A P/E-multiple trim inverts on a peak-cycle cyclical
The watchlist's "Trim NNx fwd" convention computes its dollar level as NN x (price / forward P/E), so it scales with whatever EPS the market currently forecasts. On a compounder that is the point — the trim rises with earnings.
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A REIT WACC has no interest tax shield, and CAPM inverts inside net-lease
Two standard WACC inputs break on REITs in the same direction — the after-tax cost of debt (a REIT pays no entity tax, so the interest deduction is worth nothing) and CAPM's cost of equity (net-lease betas rank inversely to…
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A broker export older than a correctly-logged trade reports as drift, and --write would erase the trade
[portfolio-specific detail removed from the public build]
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A commercial-launch biotech's prior-year revenue is licensing, so YoY revenue growth prints negative during a successful launch
A biotech in its first years of commercialisation books upfront and milestone payments from ex-US licensing deals as revenue. Those payments are lumpy, near-100% gross margin, and can exceed early product sales.
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A company-chosen discount rate below its own traded cost of capital inflates the asset metric the bull case rests on
When a company publishes a DCF-derived asset metric (Net Earning Assets, NAV, embedded value, portfolio fair value) it also chooses the discount rate.
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A company-defined revenue segment can be grown by migration, not by demand
When a company reports a self-defined revenue segment — "Strategic Revenue", "Core", "Platform", "Adjusted" — the segment boundary is a management choice, not an accounting standard, and the segment's growth rate can be inflated…
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A cyber incident prices on quantification, not on disclosure — and the first estimate is half the truth
The day-one move on a corporate cyberattack disclosure carries almost no information — across ten incidents it clustered between -3.6% and +1.0% regardless of eventual cost.
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A deferred-tax valuation allowance booked then released breaks two years of EPS
When a tax-law change forces a company to write a valuation allowance against its deferred tax assets and it later releases that allowance, GAAP net income takes a huge charge in one quarter and an equally huge credit in another.
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A deferred-tax valuation-allowance release inflates one quarter's GAAP EPS far above pretax income
When a company that has been accumulating losses reaches sustained profitability, it releases the valuation allowance held against its deferred tax assets, booking a large one-time non-cash tax BENEFIT that pushes that quarter's…
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A deleveraging target that does not close on organic cash flow implies an unannounced asset sale
When a levered company gives a leverage target and a date, do the arithmetic: (net debt today − target multiple × forecast EBITDA) ÷ (free cash flow − dividends).
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A differential re-analysis can only re-test claims the baseline wrote down, so a missed event stays missed forever
/analyze-from-before builds its delta ledger from the baseline report, then researches the window since the baseline date.
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A disclosed ASP series settles cyclical-vs-structural when revenue alone cannot
Some component suppliers disclose their weighted-average selling price change and their unit volume change every year in MD&A.
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A divested segment corrupts multi-year CAGRs, and the error always understates growth
When a company divests or discontinues a segment, vendor feeds restate the recent years to continuing operations but frequently leave the oldest years at the old total-company basis — so any CAGR computed across the boundary…
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A drift scan is a work queue with a timestamp, not an inventory of current state
[portfolio-specific detail removed from the public build]
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A fixed exchange ratio with no collar turns target holders into forced sellers of the acquirer
When a stock-funded acquisition uses a fixed exchange ratio with no collar, target holders carry the acquirer's price risk from announcement to close. If they wanted cash and were prorated into stock, they sell it immediately.
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A free-cash-flow guide held unchanged while revenue and operating income are raised is a capex confession
When a company raises its revenue guide and its non-GAAP operating-income guide in the same release but leaves the free-cash-flow guide unchanged, the unmoved line is the informative one.
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A growth rate quoted as a multiple of a collapsing base inverts the signal — the ratio improves as the number deteriorates
When management reports a segment's growth as "N times faster than overall growth" rather than as its own percentage, the multiple rises automatically as the denominator falls.
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A guided margin-expansion rate is a finite lever quoted as if it were perpetual, and the ceiling never appears in guidance
When management's EPS algorithm is built from revenue growth plus a guided annual margin expansion plus buybacks, the margin term has a hard ceiling that the guidance never states and no ratio surfaces.
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A headline KPI whose measurement basis was widened by the very transaction under legal attack
When a company acquires, pays for, or partners its way into a rival's audience, the third-party panel metric it reports (Comscore uniques, app installs, traffic share) may silently start including the rival's properties from the deal date.
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A headline RPO is not backlog until you strip pass-through, check the recognition schedule, and read the termination clause
Remaining performance obligation is quoted as though it were contracted profit, but three disclosures routinely gut it and all three sit in different parts of the filing.
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A market sell-to-cover on RSU vesting is coded S, not F, and reads as discretionary selling
Form 4 code F means shares withheld BY THE ISSUER for tax.
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A multiple-form trim silently inherits whatever is wrong with the vendor P/E field it is derived from
The watchlist writes trims as "Trim NNx fwd" so the dollar level tracks earnings between analyses. The site computes that dollar as NN x (price / vendor P/E).
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A non-GAAP definition change leaves a fingerprint — the same prior period filed twice
When a company widens a non-GAAP metric it must restate the prior-period comparative on the new basis.
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A partially-empty vendor snapshot is not missing data — pull the statements before calling a name unscorable
[portfolio-specific detail removed from the public build]
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A pattern-based privacy gate cannot find a disclosure phrased with a noun it lacks
A redaction gate built from patterns scoped to specific nouns will pass any disclosure phrased with a different noun, and will report success while doing it.
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A press-reported investigation that appears in no filing has no status clock
When a regulatory investigation is known only from press reporting and the company has never disclosed it in a 10-K or 10-Q, there is no company-sourced status at all, so the staleness clock runs from the last INDEPENDENT report…
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A private-stake mark moves on the per-share price, not on the investee's market cap
To test whether a marked equity stake will be written up or down next quarter, compare the investee's CURRENT SHARE PRICE against the PER-SHARE PRICE used at the last mark date, and multiply by the shares held.
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A seasonal peak quarter's FCF read as a TTM figure inverts the cash-flow trend
A single quarter's free cash flow, taken from a quarterly statement column and described as "TTM," will look like a decline against the prior full year whenever the business is seasonal — because one quarter of a four-quarter…
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A sequential give-back from a peak is not a margin step-down
Comparing a company's next-quarter margin GUIDE against its most recent sequential PEAK manufactures a "permanent step-down" out of ordinary quarter-to-quarter noise; the test that settles it is the year-over-year margin and the…
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A shrinking user base mechanically improves its own penetration and ARPU metrics, so those metrics confirm a turnaround that is not happening
When a subscription or engagement business loses users, it loses them in order of engagement — the casual, marginal, least-monetizable leave first.
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A stable multi-year seasonal ratio is a strong structural-decline detector — when the ratio breaks, the cause is not the market
For a business with a hard seasonal pattern, the H2/H1 (or Q4/Q3) revenue ratio is remarkably stable across years and across macro conditions, because the seasonality is driven by customer budget calendars rather than by demand levels.
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A stale entry zone silently suppresses the name it is attached to
An entry zone is a derivative of a fair value, so it goes stale exactly when the fair value does — and a zone left above the current price makes every scan report the name as "still below its add zone," which reads as not yet…
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A stale fair value costs the most on a winner — the position grows while the ceiling stands still
A fair value that is not refreshed does not fail symmetrically. On a falling name it gets re-tested quickly because the loss demands attention.
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A supply outage is an availability failure, not a quality failure — underwrite time-to-restore
When a manufacturer cannot ship, the variable that decides whether customers come back is not the severity of the cause, the attack type, the ransom, or the headline.
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A tangible-equity-unit issuance breaks share count, market cap, EV and forward P/E at once
A tangible equity unit (TEU) splits into a prepaid stock purchase contract booked in shareholders' equity and an amortizing note booked as debt.
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A third-party advertiser panel measured one surface and inverted the conclusion the issuer's own disclosure supported
Third-party measurement panels (Tinuiti, Sensor Tower, Similarweb, Superads and peers) sample a narrow slice — one platform surface, one region, one client mix — and are routinely quoted as if they described the consolidated company.
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A tranche ladder flattened into one frontmatter field becomes a zone that is always "in"
A multi-tranche entry ladder collapsed into a single entry: LOW-HIGH frontmatter field becomes a band as wide as the whole ladder, which reports the name as in-zone at nearly any price.
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A triple-net master lease does not remove operational risk — it concentrates it, and the protection inverts as tenant coverage approaches 1.0x
The standard net-lease thesis is that the tenant bears operating risk while the landlord collects contractual rent. That holds only while the tenant's rent coverage is comfortable.
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A written gate gets marked satisfied on management's adjective instead of its own arithmetic
When a prior analysis gates an upgrade on a falsifiable numeric test, the next earnings print arrives wrapped in management language that sounds like the test — "growth accelerated again", "momentum returned", "record backlog".
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ADR feeds divide USD ADR price by ordinary-share book value, inflating P/B by the ADR ratio
On ADRs, vendor feeds frequently apply the ADR ratio to the price field but not to the book-value-per-share field, and separately fail to convert the local-currency book value to USD.
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After a spin-off, vendor consensus and reported actuals sit on different bases for at least a quarter
For at least one reporting period after a spin-off, the company reports pro-forma results excluding the spun entity while vendor consensus still reflects the pre-spin company.
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After a spin-off, vendor feeds keep serving the carve-out balance sheet — which omits the separation debt entirely
A newly spun-off company's vendor balance sheet is the pre-separation carve-out for weeks or months after the distribution.
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An Up-C structure corrupts six separate vendor fields at once — and two that look broken are correct
In an Up-C (public C-corp over an LLC with exchangeable member units), Yahoo/fin.py break in six places simultaneously: impliedSharesOutstanding double-counts the exchange by adding the non-economic voting stub on top of a base…
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An earnout revaluation is booked in operating expense, so it inflates operating income and defeats the net-margin tripwire
A change in the fair value of contingent consideration (an acquisition earnout) is recorded in OPERATING expenses under ASC 805, not below the operating line.
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An issuer that terminates its ADR programme becomes fully analysable — verify, don't assume
The ADR data traps are properties of the depositary structure, not of foreign domicile.
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Any figure carrying the verdict must come from the filing
Vendor feeds have been caught misreporting the exact figures that decide verdicts — FCF, margins, non-operating income — so any number the conclusion rests on gets pulled from the 10-K/10-Q or press release, not from a data feed.
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Any sizing recommendation must read both account files, not just the default one
[portfolio-specific detail removed from the public build]
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Asset-light franchisor revenue includes cost reimbursements that pass through at zero margin, overstating the revenue base by 2-3x
Hotel, restaurant and other asset-light franchisors report a large cost-reimbursement and marketing-fund line inside IFRS/GAAP revenue.
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Buyback-manufactured EPS growth screens identically to operating growth, and the market pays the same multiple for both
A company with flat operating income and flat free cash flow can post double-digit EPS growth indefinitely by retiring shares, and no screener distinguishes that EPS from operating EPS.
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Cabot (CBT) is not a semiconductor company
Cabot Corp's CMP slurry business left in 2000 and now sits inside Entegris — CBT today is ~63% carbon black for tires, so including it in a semiconductor-materials basket flatters the group's numbers with an unrelated business.
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Capex routed through finance leases vanishes from both the capex line and adjusted FCF
A company can add a billion dollars of productive assets in a year, report a falling capex line, and publish a positive free-cash-flow margin throughout — by acquiring the equipment under finance leases and equipment-financing…
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Check the deferred-tax line before believing any free-cash-flow surge
[portfolio-specific detail removed from the public build]
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Console lock-in is symmetric — it protects the incumbent for weeks and excludes it for years
In razor-and-blade capital-equipment markets (EP catheters, surgical robots, sequencers, analysers, lithography), the installed console is usually read as a one-way moat. It is not.
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Conviction scoring fails on unused range, not on coarse increments — keep 0.5 steps and use the tails
Measured across 141 watchlist entries, the 0-10 conviction scale operates in practice as a 3.5-8.5 scale with 62% of names inside a 1.5-point band.
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Correcting one name's forward multiple while leaving its peers on vendor data invents or destroys a discount
A relative-value comparison is only valid if every name in it is on the same basis.
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Diluted share count jumps when a company crosses from loss to profit, and it reads as dilution
In a GAAP loss year all dilutive securities are anti-dilutive and excluded, so diluted shares equal basic. In the next profit year options and RSUs enter the denominator all at once.
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Dividend Yield Theory inverts into a buy signal exactly when the business is breaking
DYT compares current yield to a historical yield band, but the yield can only rise two ways — the dividend went up or the price went down — and DYT cannot tell them apart, so a collapsing price mechanically produces DYT's…
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Dividend-adjusted close prices silently break historical multiple and yield bands
Yahoo's default close price is dividend-adjusted, so building a historical P/E, P/AFFO or P/B band from it understates every past multiple by the cumulative dividend yield — on a high-yield name this manufactures a false "it has…
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ENTG FY2025 margins are wrong in both Yahoo and roic.ai
Entegris FY2025 margins are corrupted in Yahoo and roic.ai simultaneously — the widely quoted ~41% EBITDA margin is fiction, the true figure is 13–17% — proving that cross-validating two vendor feeds is not an independent check.
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EPS and share-count CAGRs use the weighted average, which cannot see a step change in shares
Every per-share figure in a vendor feed — EPS, diluted-share CAGR, P/E — is built on the WEIGHTED-AVERAGE share count, which by construction lags a discrete issuance. Market cap is built on the BALANCE-SHEET count, which does not.
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Each replenishment of a state liability backstop extracts more from shareholders
A state-sponsored liability backstop (a wildfire fund, an insurance pool, a bailout framework) protects the enterprise, not the equity.
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Equity issued to customers is contra-revenue, and adding it back manufactures both growth and margin
When a vendor issues warrants to its own customers as a commercial inducement, GAAP capitalises a "customer warrant asset" and amortises it as a REDUCTION OF REVENUE over the life of the related contracts.
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Every AI-levered field trades above its own historical multiple band
As of July 2026, every AI-adjacent field swept traded above its own historical multiple band despite large drawdowns, because the drawdown is smaller than the preceding run-up — so drawdown-driven screens in AI-adjacent sectors…
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Flat margins during share loss mean the damage is ahead, not that the moat held
The standard moat test reads margin compression as moat erosion, so stable margins read as an intact moat. But an incumbent under attack chooses between ceding volume and cutting price, and only the second shows up in margin.
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Foreign ADR tickers silently resolve to the wrong company
ADR ticker lookups return clean, plausible data for an entirely different company — SCRYY resolves to SCOR SE not Screen Holdings, CPCAY to Cathay Pacific not Capcom — so always confirm the returned company name before using any foreign-listing data.
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Forward P/E higher than trailing P/E on a company guiding earnings down means the trailing base is fake
Forward P/E should sit below trailing P/E whenever earnings are expected to grow.
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Government-warrant derivative liabilities make GAAP EPS a function of the share price
When a company issues warrants to a government or strategic investor and books them as a derivative liability rather than as equity, the mark-to-market runs through income — so the GAAP loss GROWS as the stock rises.
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Headcount-vs-revenue divergence is the only hard test of AI deflation in services
Labour-based services firms (IT services, BPO, consulting) are all being marked down on the same thesis — that generative AI deflates the seat-based model faster than it creates new demand — and management commentary cannot…
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In a shortage, revenue growth and market-share loss coexist — check units, not dollars
During a supply shortage a company can post its fastest revenue growth in years while losing unit share in every segment, because price and mix carry the whole increase.
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In a tech selloff, value is deepest in application software and shallowest in hardware
Across the March 2026 screen series the same ranking held at every pass — application software offered the deepest value, then cybersecurity and infrastructure software, with hardware consistently weakest on risk/reward — so…
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Incremental gross margin below the average locks in future margin decay — it is an identity, not a forecast
Compute incremental gross margin as the change in gross profit divided by the change in revenue, and compare it to the average gross margin.
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Logo retention is structurally blind to share-of-wallet loss — a >95% retention rate alongside ~0% revenue growth means clients stayed and spent less
"Customer retention >95%" counts accounts, not dollars.
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Moving supplier costs out of contra-revenue inflates reported revenue growth and deflates gross margin, and only the 10-Q shows it
A company can move supplier or data costs from contra-revenue (netted against the top line) into operating expense.
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Names repeatedly re-surfaced by screens that are no longer investable
Screening sources keep surfacing companies that have been acquired, taken private, delisted or wound down — check this list before researching any unfamiliar name, because the research is wasted and the "cheap valuation" is often a stale artifact.
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Net margin above operating margin means the profit came from below the operating line
Net margin should always sit below operating margin — interest and tax subtract. When a screen shows net margin above operating margin, the excess did not come from the business.
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Net margin below operating margin does not clear a company of an investment mark
The net-margin-below-operating-margin tripwire only detects a non-operating gain large enough to invert the inequality.
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Never derive an average cost — copy it from the broker, because specific-lot sales move it
Logging a sale as "fewer shares, same average cost" is wrong whenever the broker sells specific lots rather than an average, which is the normal case.
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Never discount a local-currency return at a USD cost of equity
A foreign company's reported ROE is denominated in its functional currency, not in USD — discounting a local-nominal return stream at a USD cost of equity credits the full nominal local return in the numerator while charging only…
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On ADRs, Yahoo's two EPS fields can be in different currencies, which corrupts the current-year fix
On a US-listed ADR, Yahoo's epsCurrentYear/priceEpsCurrentYear can be quoted in the company's LOCAL reporting currency (e.g. RMB, BRL) while forwardEps/forwardPE is quoted in USD against the ADR price.
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On a local-currency-reporting ADR the broken enterprise value is invertible — it encodes true net cash in the reporting currency
For an ADR that reports in a currency other than USD, Yahoo/fin.py computes enterprise value by subtracting the LOCAL-CURRENCY cash and investments from a USD market cap. The result is wrong and often negative.
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On some filers the vendor income-statement gross profit silently absorbs SG&A — and Yahoo's own snapshot field contradicts its own statement line
For certain filers, vendor normalization maps segment-level SG&A into "Cost of Revenue" and leaves only corporate G&A in operating expense, so the income-statement gross margin lands 6-8 points below the reported figure.
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Peer earnings dates drift year over year, and syndicated calendars propagate the drift
Extrapolating a company's next earnings date from last year's date is unreliable — the date moves by days or weeks, and syndicated financial sites publish the extrapolation as fact.
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Quick ratio is meaningless for payroll and client-fund processors
Payroll processors report client payroll funds they hold in trust as current liabilities, which crushes the quick ratio to a fraction of 1 regardless of actual liquidity — PCTY reads 0.094 and ADP reads 0.155 for the same structural reason.
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Regulation that standardises a method flattens a moat; regulation that restricts entry deepens one
"Regulated industry" is not a moat descriptor and carries no directional information on its own.
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Reject valuations that rest on TAM rather than revenue
A valuation supported by addressable-market size rather than realised revenue is a story, not a thesis — require the revenue line to exist and grow before any multiple is applied.
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Script-data drug sales are gross of rebates and can be 45% above company-reported
IQVIA-style prescription data measures US drug sales at list price while the company reports net of rebates, so the two figures for the same product in the same year can differ by the entire gross-to-net spread — up to ~70% of…
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Short interest as a percent of float is inflated ~2x on founder-controlled companies
Short interest is conventionally quoted as a percent of FLOAT, but float excludes insider-held shares. On a founder-controlled company the float can be half the shares outstanding, so the same short position reads roughly double.
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Shortlists published into a fear-priced tape run 8-27% within two weeks — and have not been executed
Shortlists published into a fear-priced tape have run 8-27% within two weeks on all three occasions recorded (2026-07-14, 07-29, 08-04), so the analysis layer is reliable.
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Simple FCF and company-adjusted FCF diverge by billions when JV partner funds move
For companies that co-fund assets with JV or SCIP-style partners, vendor "free cash flow" (operating cash flow minus capex) and the company's own "adjusted free cash flow" can differ by more than the entire capex line, because…
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Swapping equity comp for cash comp is neutral on owner earnings and looks like progress
When a company reduces stock-based compensation by shifting the compensation mix toward cash, SBC falls and free cash flow falls by the same amount, so SBC-adjusted FCF is mathematically unchanged — yet the headline "SBC as a…
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Syndicated market research inverts who invested in whom
Syndicated market-research summaries reverse the direction of strategic minority investments, reporting the issuer as the acquirer.
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The AI build inflates reported earnings and destroys free cash flow at the same time
In 2026 the AI capital cycle shows up in financial statements as two simultaneous and opposite distortions: non-operating marks on private AI stakes INFLATE reported earnings, while capex or AI-delivery COGS DESTROY the free cash…
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The vendor country field is the principal executive office address, not the jurisdiction of incorporation
Yahoo and .mcp/fin.py populate the country field from the issuer's principal executive office address, not from its jurisdiction of incorporation.
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Three consecutive analyses placing fair value above a falling price is a method failure, not three unlucky calls — audit the anchor before publishing the fourth
When successive re-underwritings of the same name each cut fair value but each still land ABOVE the prevailing price, and the price goes through every one, the pattern is diagnostic of the method rather than of the market.
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Two vendors report the same company's buybacks 6x apart because one folds RSU tax withholding into the line
The cash a company spends withholding shares to cover employees' RSU tax bills is a financing outflow that looks exactly like a buyback, and vendors disagree about whether to put it in the "share repurchase" line.
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Unrealized equity-stake marks break the headline P/E on megacaps
Under ASU 2016-01 a company must mark its equity holdings to fair value through net income, so a large private stake that IPOs or revalues can inject tens or hundreds of billions of non-operating, non-cash income into GAAP…
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Vendor "revenue" for banks is a net construct, not the reported top line
Yahoo and roic.ai report bank revenue as a net figure (roughly net interest income plus net fee income), which can understate the issuer's own reported total revenue by a third — making every vendor-derived P/S, revenue CAGR and…
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Vendor enterprise value is computed off a stale market cap and can imply net debt on a net-cash company — float exceeding shares outstanding is the free tell
Yahoo's enterpriseValue is not recomputed on the same clock as marketCap.
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Vendor enterprise value omits the non-controlling interest, so EV/EBITDA reads too cheap on any parent with a listed subsidiary
Yahoo's enterpriseValue is market cap + debt − cash. It adds no non-controlling interest.
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Vendor feeds zero out deployment and inflate debt for sales-type-lease REITs
For REITs that book acquisitions as sales-type or financing-receivable lease investments rather than as business combinations, Yahoo and roic.ai report an acquisition line of exactly zero while billions are being deployed, and…
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Vendor forward EPS does not move on the day of a guidance cut, so the crash makes the stock screen cheapest exactly when it got worse
Consensus forward EPS in a vendor snapshot is a rolling average of analyst estimates and does not update same-day after a guidance cut — but price does, instantly.
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Vendor forward P/E silently uses the wrong fiscal year, and it flips verdicts
Yahoo's forwardPE/forwardEps does not state which fiscal year it estimates, and it is frequently neither the current year nor a consistent one across tickers — sometimes a year already three-quarters reported, sometimes a year out.
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When a land-light company capitalizes its option carry fee into asset basis, today's gross margin is flattered and the cost arrives in COGS 8-12 quarters later
A company that converts owned assets into optioned assets pays a continuing carry fee to the option counterparty. Under ASC 970 that fee may be capitalized into the asset basis rather than expensed as incurred.
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When a platform's ranking function sets monetization intensity, its KPIs are policy variables, not demand signals
If a platform's discovery algorithm can be tuned toward extraction, then its reported DAUs, hours and bookings measure the setting of that dial as much as they measure user demand — so a growth vintage produced by an…
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When every signal that makes a stock look cheap is an artifact, the trap is in the screen — not in the stock
A de-rating company can generate a full set of value signals - a low trailing P/E, a high dividend yield, a large drawdown from the high - where every one is mechanically produced by the de-rating itself rather than by the price falling below value.
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Yahoo files strategic-investment marks under Interest Income
Yahoo Finance misclassifies mark-to-market gains on strategic equity stakes as "Interest Income", inflating apparent non-operating yield to impossible levels — sanity-check interest income against the cash balance.
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Yahoo maps creator payouts and infrastructure into COGS, turning a contribution margin into a "gross margin"
For platform businesses that pay out to creators, Yahoo's grossMargins field nets content/creator payouts and infrastructure out of gross profit and labels the result a gross margin.
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Yahoo mixes reporting currency and quote currency on cross-listed issuers
For an issuer that reports in one currency but trades in another (CAD-reporting, USD-listed), Yahoo converts the PER-SHARE fields to the quote currency but leaves the AGGREGATE income-statement fields in the reporting currency…
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Yahoo reports a gross and operating margin for banks and lenders that does not exist
Yahoo's getstockinfo returns populated grossMargins and operatingMargins for banks, lenders and card networks, which have no cost-of-goods-sold line and therefore no gross margin.
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Yahoo's EV/EBITDA can be computed off EBIT, inflating the multiple by the full D&A load — the tell is EV/EBITDA landing near a plausible EV/EBIT
Yahoo's enterpriseToEbitda is not always computed from EBITDA. On issuers carrying heavy acquired-intangible amortisation it tracks the EV/EBIT series instead, overstating the multiple by the entire D&A load — 2x or worse.
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Yahoo's bookValue/BVPS lags a mid-year buyback-driven equity collapse
Yahoo's getstockinfo snapshot bookValue (per-share) field can stay pinned to the pre-buyback value for at least a quarter after a large — especially debt-funded — share repurchase shrinks shareholders' equity, so it overstates…
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Yahoo's dividend feed applies a spin-off factor as a "stock split", silently deflating every pre-spin dividend
When a company spins off a subsidiary, Yahoo records the value adjustment as a fractional "Stock Split" row in getstockactions and retroactively divides every earlier dividend by that factor.
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Yahoo's dividend feed can post a single declared dividend twice as one doubled row
getstockactions can return a dividend row that is exactly 2x the amount the issuer declared, with no split, no special dividend and no currency event to explain it.
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Yahoo's dividend yield uses previousClose while its P/E uses the live price
Yahoo Finance computes dividendYield and trailingAnnualDividendYield off previousClose, but computes trailingPE off currentPrice, inside the same payload.
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Yahoo's epsCurrentYear can freeze at a stale vintage while live consensus moves
Yahoo's epsCurrentYear / priceEpsCurrentYear fields can freeze at a stale vintage and never update, while the live consensus in the same vendor's epstrend table moves materially.
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Yahoo's insider-ownership field reads zero when the founder holds preferred and warrants
Yahoo's heldPercentInsiders counts common stock only. A founder or sponsor whose entire stake is convertible preferred plus warrants shows as 0.00% insider ownership - the exact inverse of the truth.
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Yahoo's insider_purchases field counts RSU grants and option conversions as "purchases"
Yahoo Finance's insiderpurchases summary reports RSU vesting at $0.00 and option conversions at legacy strikes as open-market "purchases" — on RBLX it showed "+3.5M net shares purchased, 12.3% buy" during a period with literally…
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Yahoo's sharesOutstanding returns only the listed class on dual-class foreign issuers
For dual-class companies — foreign private issuers were where this was found, but US domestic filers fail identically — Yahoo's sharesOutstanding field reports only the exchange-listed class, omitting unlisted super-voting…
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Yahoo's snapshot "freeCashflow" field disagrees with a reconciled sum of its own quarterly statements
Yahoo's getstockinfo snapshot returns a trailing "freeCashflow" field that does not always equal the sum of the four most recent quarters in its own getfinancialstatement (quarterlycashflow) response — even when that sum is…
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fin.py --screen returns a fixed 25 rows, so "I screened the market" is really "I read 25 rows"
.mcp/fin.py --screen defaulted to 25 rows with no way to override it, so every screen returned exactly 25 regardless of how many names passed the filter, under a "— 25 hits" header that reads like a match count.
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fin.py mixes annual-statement and most-recent-quarter as-of dates
.mcp/fin.py prints its balance-sheet block from the latest ANNUAL statement while the snapshot block's price-derived ratios (BVPS, P/B, EV, D/E) come from Yahoo's most-recent-quarter fields.
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kb.py find searched only Knowledge/, so "has this been analyzed?" was unanswerable
[portfolio-specific detail removed from the public build]
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roic.ai FCF field returns OCF with capex null
Whenever roic.ai's cfcapexpenditures is null, it publishes cffreecashflow equal to cfcashfromoper — FCF with no capex subtracted — and silently propagates the error into freecashflowpersh and prtofreecashflow.
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roic.ai on this account returns only 2 years of history, not the 20-40 the Tool Hierarchy assumes
CLAUDE.md's Tool Hierarchy lists roic.ai as the escalation path for "20-40yr statement history," but on the currently-authorized account it silently returns a single fiscal year and refuses any request reaching further back.
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yfinance fast_info.previous_close is unreliable — it corrupts every computed day change
yfinance's fastinfo.previousclose does not reliably return the prior regular-session close.
Themes23
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Automotive ADAS & sensing semiconductors
Swept 2026-06-12 over two rounds and 25 names as an INDI alternatives search — nothing cleared, and the pass also surfaced unresolved market-cap discrepancies between Yahoo and web sources on SITM, VICR and POWI.
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BACEN systematically commoditizes each profitable layer of Brazilian banking
Brazil's central bank runs a consistent, repeated policy of building free public infrastructure that competes away the profit pool of each banking layer in turn — payments, then data, then interest rates, then installment credit…
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BDCs & private-credit income
Swept twice (Apr and Jul 2026) against a deteriorating private-credit backdrop — BDC secondary sales fell 40% amid lengthening default shadows — so the field was screened on dividend coverage and NAV discipline rather than on yield.
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Broad cross-sector value & global-vs-US screens
Broad "find value anywhere" screens have consistently underperformed field-specific ones in this repo — they surface names already covered elsewhere and, in the global case, produced an FX artifact mistaken for a discount.
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Consulting, IT services & enterprise IT
Swept Jun and Jul 2026 — the useful distinction is revenue model, not sector: IT (Gartner) sells subscriptions and BAH sells government work, both uncorrelated to the project-based tech-spending cycle that drives ACN and CTSH.
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Crypto-linked equities
Swept 2026-07-29 — since the user already holds BTC directly, coin-beta names are leverage on an existing position rather than diversification, so the only interesting question is which names have a real business independent of the coin price.
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Fintech, payments & financial infrastructure
Swept 2026-03-21 for Visa-like asset-light toll-booth businesses — the field's quality is uniformly high so the binding constraint is price, not business selection.
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GLP-1, obesity & metabolic pharma
Swept 2026-07-31 via NVO — the field is the largest therapeutic category in pharma history and is simultaneously the clearest case of a huge field with a losing incumbent: obesity volume compounds for decades while value per…
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Gaming, adtech & consumer internet
Swept 2026-07-29 — NTES (conviction 7.0) survived as a non-AI-levered survivor, but it carries China structural risk, which is a different risk class from the valuation risk the sweep was screening for.
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Hardware, networking, storage, components & electrical infrastructure
Swept across five March 2026 screens — consistently the weakest risk/reward layer in the tech selloff (narrower moats, softer FCF) with NTAP/CDW/ZBRA the only names of interest; never refreshed since, so the entire field is stale by four months.
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Health tech & healthcare software
Swept 2026-07-29 and produced the best result of the entire July exercise — DOCS at conviction 7.0 and in its entry zone, because the field is not AI-narrative-levered and so did not participate in the run-up that left every adjacent field expensive.
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Healthcare, energy, industrials/materials, staples & telecom
Swept 2026-07-29 as the "unswept fields" pass and rejected by the user on business-model grounds rather than valuation — the durable finding is that the 2026 defensive rotation bought the label, not the cash flow.
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Japan tech & semiconductors
Swept 2026-07-29 and the premise failed — Japan's apparent discount was an FX artifact (EWJ −8.4% ≈ yen −8.41%, while TOPIX set a record close), and Japanese AI names carry zero discount, with Advantest at 60x P/E and 28x P/B.
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Nuclear, uranium & the enrichment pipeline
Swept 2026-06-10 across the full fuel-cycle stack (mining → enrichment → SMR → generation) — the durable finding is that the layers carry completely different risk types, so "nuclear exposure" is meaningless without naming the layer.
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Optical, photonics & datacom interconnect
Swept 2026-07-29, no entries — 10 of 13 names traded above their own historical bands (LITE at 2.6x its own recent-high P/B) and three of the field's familiar names are no longer independently investable.
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Quantum computing
Swept 2026-04-28 (IONQ, RGTI, QBTS) — only QBTS cleared the bar for even a speculative position, and only on a 40-45% pullback, because it was the sole name with a demonstrable near-term business rather than a roadmap.
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REITs — US & Canada
Swept twice (Apr and Jul 2026) on a discount-to-NAV/AFFO-durability basis, with the July run adding US net-lease and industrial names; AFFO coverage rather than headline yield was the operative filter throughout.
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Robotics, automation, machine vision & physical AI
Swept 2026-07-29, no entries — the quality names (CGNX, ZBRA and peers) trade at 32-35x earnings despite the selloff, so the field is a watch-for-price list rather than a research problem.
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Semiconductor equipment (WFE) & automated test (ATE)
Swept 2026-07-15 to 07-29, no entries — all 11 ATE names traded above their own historical multiple bands despite a −28.6% SOX drawdown, and the WFE names that matter are gated on August prints rather than on price.
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Semiconductor materials, consumables & subsystems
Swept 2026-07-29, no gems — materials tracks fab UTILIZATION while equipment tracks fab CAPEX, so "materials is the defensive way to own semis" holds against capex cuts and inverts against utilization declines; in the July 2026…
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Small-cap AI, defense, space, drones & precision industrials
Swept heavily in June 2026 (50+ names across four screens) and the field's own verdict was that it is "genuinely hard to screen right now" — quality is scarce, the graveyard of dead names is large, and story-over-revenue is the dominant failure mode.
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Software & SaaS — all subsectors
The most heavily swept field in the repo (12+ screens, Mar–Jul 2026) — the March SaaSpocalypse produced genuine below-own-band value in application software, but no screen has ever been scored against outcomes, so the field's real lesson is still unread.
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US homebuilders — an industry-wide price war where the cheapest names are cheap on book and dear on earnings
First look at the field, 2026-08-19, via LEN plus a seven-name peer read.