LHX · Analyze — Financebot

Industrials / Aerospace & Defense · United States · ~45,000 employees Price $277.11 · Market cap $51.6B · 52wk $262.68 – $379.23 (−27% from high, +5% off the low)

One line: A genuinely good defense operating business trapped inside a balance sheet that paid too much for it. The 27% drawdown removed the bubble, not the price. Fair, not cheap.

0. Knowledge check

kb.py find LHX → no prior notes. First analysis of this name. Knowledge/Themes/smallcap-defense-space-drones.md covers the small-cap defence field (as-of 2026-06-15) and does not reach the primes. Researched fresh.

Pitfalls applied before trusting any vendor figure — see §7 Data integrity. Six vendor fields on this name are wrong or mislabelled. Two of them, taken at face value, invert the verdict from WATCH to BUY.

1. Fundamentals

1.1 The reported picture

Metric (TTM, Q3'25–Q2'26)	Value
Revenue	$22.93B
Operating income (GAAP)	$2.31B
EBITDA	$4.00B
Net income	$1.86B
GAAP diluted EPS	$9.97
Operating cash flow	$3.29B
Capex	$0.48B
Free cash flow	$2.81B
Interest expense	$0.56B

Fiscal year	2022	2023	2024	2025
Revenue	$17.06B	$19.42B	$21.32B	$21.86B
Operating income	$1.93B	$1.80B	$2.02B	$2.15B
Net income	$1.06B	$1.23B	$1.50B	$1.61B
GAAP diluted EPS	$5.49	$6.44	$7.87	$8.53
FCF	$1.91B	$1.65B	$2.15B	$2.68B
Diluted shares	193.5M	190.6M	190.7M	188.4M

1.2 Growth — and why the headline CAGR overstates it

Metric	3yr CAGR (2022→2025)
Revenue	8.6%
Net income	14.8%
FCF	12.1%
Diluted shares	−0.9%

These CAGRs are not organic. The window contains the $4.7B Aerojet Rocketdyne acquisition (July 2023) and the divestiture of the commercial-aviation business. Buying $2B of revenue and calling the result an 8.6% growth rate is arithmetic, not performance. The company's own organic figure for 2026 is 7%, and that is the number to use.

The vendor also cannot supply FY2021, so the framework's preferred 5–8yr FCF CAGR is not computable from the feed. This matters: 2019–2021 contains the L3 merger, so any longer series would be equally inorganic. Stated plainly rather than papered over — there is no clean multi-year organic growth series for this company. Every CAGR here carries an M&A footnote.

1.3 Per-share — the owner's view

	FY2025	TTM
Revenue / share	$116.06	$122.96
FCF / share	$14.24	$15.06
Tangible book / share	−$28.9	−$30.6

Share count is falling ~1.1%/yr — a real but modest tailwind. The third line is the problem and it gets its own section.

1.4 Capital allocation — where the cash actually went

Cumulative FY2023–FY2025: FCF $6.49B.

Use	Amount	% of 3yr FCF
Dividends	$2.66B	41%
Buybacks	$2.22B	34%
Acquisitions (Aerojet, 2023)	$6.69B	103%
Net debt movement	+$3.99B issued, then −$2.0B repaid 2024–25	—

They returned 75% of free cash flow to shareholders while simultaneously borrowing $4B to buy Aerojet. That is a levered return-of-capital policy, and it is the reason the balance sheet looks the way it does.

Credit where due on the follow-through: debt peaked at $13.12B (2023) and is now $11.00B, with $2.0B repaid across 2024–25 and buybacks stepped up to $1.15B in 2025 as leverage came down. The deleveraging is real and on schedule.

1.5 Balance sheet (Q2 2026)

Metric	Value	Read
Total assets	$42.94B
Total debt	$11.00B	↓ from $13.12B peak
Cash	$1.52B
Net debt	$9.48B
Stockholders' equity	$20.85B
Goodwill	$20.00B
Other intangibles	$6.54B
Tangible equity	−$5.69B	negative
Debt / assets	25.6%	comfortable
Net debt / EBITDA	2.37x	acceptable for a prime
Interest coverage (EBIT/int)	4.1x	adequate, not strong

$26.5B of the $42.9B asset base is goodwill and acquired intangibles — 62%. Book equity of $20.85B is entirely accounting residue from the L3 merger and Aerojet. Strip it and shareholders own negative $5.7B of tangible net assets, or −$30.6/share. roic.ai confirms independently: price-to-tangible-book of −7.97.

This is not automatically disqualifying — defense primes are contract and IP businesses, not asset businesses — but it removes the downside floor. There is no book value to fall back on, and Graham's model (§4) is running on air.

1.6 Fundamentals scorecard

Test	Result
FCF positive and growing	$2.81B TTM, +47% vs FY2023	PASS
FCF CAGR 5–8yr	not computable — no clean series	FLAG
Capital allocation	75% of FCF returned, but $6.7B M&A on borrowed money	FLAG
Debt / assets	25.6%, deleveraging	PASS
Interest coverage	4.1x	MIXED
Share count	−1.1%/yr	PASS
Top line	+7% organic	PASS
Bottom line	GAAP EPS +16%/yr; adj EPS +11%	PASS
Per-share FCF	$14.24 → $15.06	PASS
Tangible book	−$30.6/share	RED FLAG

2. Moat

2.1 Quantitative base — the number that defines this company

	FY2024	FY2025	TTM
ROIC (roic.ai / computed)	5.69%	5.61%	6.22%
ROE	7.85%	8.20%	~9.0%
Gross margin (roic.ai)	25.9%	25.7%	—
GAAP operating margin	9.45%	9.83%	10.1%
Adjusted segment operating margin (company)	15.4%	15.8%	low-16% guided

ROIC of 6.2% is below any plausible cost of capital. With beta 0.75, cost of equity lands near 7.5–8%; blended WACC with $11B of debt is roughly 6.5–7.5%. L3Harris is earning, at best, its cost of capital — and has been below it for the two prior years.

But run the same calculation on the capital actually deployed in the business:

NOPAT $1.92B ÷ invested capital excluding goodwill and acquired intangibles ($30.9B − $26.5B = $4.35B) = ~44%

The operating business earns exceptional returns. The shareholder earns 6%. The entire gap — 44% down to 6% — is the price management paid to assemble it. This is the single most important fact about L3Harris and it is a capital-allocation verdict, not an operations verdict.

The practical consequence: the moat is real but it has already been capitalised into the purchase price and sits on the balance sheet as goodwill. Buying LHX today is not buying a 44% ROIC business; it is buying the ~6% that survives after paying for it.

2.2 Adversarial stress-test — "I am a well-funded rival. Can I take this?"

Attack vector	Verdict
Tactical radio / resilient comms (CSD)	Hardest to attack. L3Harris owns the US military's tactical-radio installed base. Displacement needs a full waveform-certification cycle, JTNC/NSA approvals, and re-training on fielded hardware. Switching costs measured in years and programmes of record. Genuine moat.
Space & Mission Systems (~$11.5B, ~50% of revenue)	Most exposed. This is where the classified-payload primes meet the new-space entrants. SpaceX/Starshield and the proliferated-LEO model attack exactly the missile-warning and space-sensor franchise. Cost-plus incumbency helps; it does not stop a customer that wants cheaper satellites faster. Contested.
Missile Solutions / propulsion (Aerojet)	Structurally protected today, contested by 2030. Solid rocket motors were a duopoly (Aerojet + Northrop). Capital, energetics handling, and safety qualification are brutal entry barriers — which is why the segment grew 14% and is negotiating $20B+ of contracts. But the shortage has drawn in funded challengers (Anduril, Ursa Major, X-Bow) with explicit DoW encouragement to break the duopoly. The moat here is capacity scarcity, and scarcity is the one moat that customers actively fund the destruction of.
Electronic warfare / spectrum	Sticky, classified, high-margin. Defensible.

Moat sources, named: switching costs (radios, programmes of record), intangibles (clearances, classified past performance, energetics IP), efficient scale (SRM duopoly), and regulatory barrier (ITAR, facility clearances). Not network effects, not brand.

2.3 Disruption forecast (5–10yr)

Software-defined and attritable systems compress the value of exquisite hardware. L3Harris is on the right side of this in comms, the wrong side in some space hardware.
The primes' cost structure is the disruption target. Golden Dome's economics assume interceptor and satellite costs falling, which pressures the incumbent margin pool even as it raises volume.
Vertical integration by customers. DoW funding second sources in propulsion is a deliberate policy to remove exactly the pricing power Aerojet was bought for.

2.4 Evergreen assessment

Durable, not evergreen. The demand is as close to permanent as equities offer — sovereign defense budgets do not churn. But the share of that demand is contested at the segment level, and the company's returns to shareholders depend less on the moat than on whether it stops overpaying for it. A business can be indestructible and still be a mediocre investment; L3Harris has spent seven years demonstrating that.

2.5 Moat defense — what management is doing

The January 2026 reorganisation (four segments → three: Space & Mission Systems, Communications & Spectrum Dominance, Missile Solutions) is a sensible response: it isolates the fast-growing, separable missile business and consolidates the defensible comms franchise. Margin discipline is showing — 15.4% → 15.8% → guided low-16%.

The Axyv IPO was the sharp end of this: carve out Missile Solutions, let the market value it at a growth multiple instead of a prime's multiple, raise capital for capacity, and crystallise the Aerojet purchase. It is a good plan. §3 covers why it slipped.

3. Sentiment & intelligence

3.1 Two shocks in three weeks

30 July 2026 — Axyv IPO postponed to mid-2027 at the earliest. Originally planned for 2H 2026. Management cited unfavourable market conditions, budget uncertainty, and the midterms, saying an IPO now would not reflect the unit's value. The stock fell 8.6% in a day, shedding roughly $4.8B of market cap, and hit its 52-week low of $262.68 shortly after.

This is the real driver of the drawdown, and the market read it correctly. The IPO was the deleveraging catalyst and the value-crystallisation catalyst and the funding source for missile capacity. Its removal does not damage the business; it removes the mechanism by which the market was going to be shown what the business is worth.

One hard constraint to diarise: the qualified-IPO deadline is 31 December 2027, after which redemption terms take effect on the Department of War's $1B convertible preferred investment. That is a real clock, not a soft target. Management also noted most of the capital was not needed until 2027–29, which is the honest mitigant.

17 August 2026 — CEO Christopher Kubasik terminated for cause after a board-directed code-of-conduct investigation. Reporting indicates an inappropriate relationship with a subordinate. Sam Mehta, 53, named CEO immediately. The stock fell a further ~4%.

Assessing this properly:

The company was explicit that the conduct was unrelated to financial reporting, controls, customer relationships, or operational performance. Taken at face value — and there is no contrary evidence — this is not an accounting or contract event.
The succession is unusually clean. Mehta already ran Space & Mission Systems and Communications & Spectrum Dominance — over 80% of revenue — since March 2026. This is not an outside parachute into an unfamiliar business.
The governance tail is the real risk. The WSJ reported on 19 August that women at L3Harris had raised concerns about the CEO's behaviour years before the ouster. If that stands, the failure is the board's oversight, not one executive's conduct, and it carries litigation and further-disclosure risk. Kubasik disputes that for-cause grounds existed, which keeps a separation dispute live.
Financially the termination is shareholder-favourable: forfeited 2026 bonus, forfeited unvested equity, no severance — roughly $45M forfeited.

Net read: a genuine governance blemish with an unresolved tail, but not a thesis breaker on its own. Two negative shocks landing three weeks apart is what took the stock to its low — and neither one touched the earnings power.

3.2 Q2 2026 — the operating results were good

Metric	Q2 2026	vs prior year
Revenue	$5.88B	+8%
Non-GAAP EPS	$3.13	beat consensus $2.80 by 11.8%
Free cash flow	$771M	+37%
Orders	$7.3B	book-to-bill 1.2x
Backlog	$42B	+$1B+
Missile Solutions revenue	$1.05B	+14%

Growth in all three segments. Backlog at a record. A $12B framework agreement with Lockheed Martin for THAAD and PAC-3 production underpins the missile ramp, and the division is negotiating $20B+ of further contracts.

Guidance raised — revenue +$200M to $23.2–23.7B, EPS +$0.40 to $11.80–12.00, FCF reaffirmed at $3.0B.

The tension worth naming: the stock fell on the day it beat and raised. That is what happens when a structural catalyst is withdrawn in the same breath as a good quarter.

3.3 Budget backdrop

The FY2027 request is $1.5T ($1.1T base + $350B reconciliation), with $17.9B for Golden Dome to move it to operational status. Supportive on its face.

The risk is mechanical, not political: Golden Dome has been funded primarily through reconciliation and has no FY2026 topline to fall back on. Gen. Guetlein warned on 12 August that the programme is in jeopardy from FY2027 funding instability — 90% of FY26 funding is already obligated and 95% committed to contracts. A continuing resolution through the midterms would bite here specifically. This is the same uncertainty management named when shelving the IPO, which at least makes their reasoning coherent.

3.4 Positioning

Analyst consensus buy, mean target $341.73 (+23%). Note at least one downgrade drove a 52-week low on 31 July.
Institutional ownership 89%. Short interest 0.02% of float — no bear thesis being expressed.
Insider activity: no signal. Every "purchase" in the feed is a director RSU/stock award grant, not an open-market buy — see §7.

4. Valuation

4.1 Establishing the correct multiple first

This is where the vendor data is most dangerous.

Basis	EPS	P/E at $277.11
GAAP TTM	$9.97	27.8x
FY2026 adj. guidance (midpoint)	$11.90	23.3x
FY2027 consensus	~$13.46	20.6x

Yahoo's "forward P/E" of 20.59 is on FY2027, not FY2026. The correct current-year forward multiple is 23.3x. That difference decides the verdict:

Peer (FY2026 fwd P/E)
Lockheed Martin	17x
General Dynamics	23.4x
L3Harris	23.3x
Northrop Grumman	24.2x
RTX	26x

At 23.3x LHX sits in line with NOC and GD, at a large premium to LMT — despite having the worst ROIC and the only negative tangible book in the group. On the vendor's 20.6x it would have looked like the cheapest large prime except LMT. It is not cheap relative to its peers. The sector as a whole trades at 22–25x forward, a clear premium to history.

4.2 Enterprise value, computed rather than taken


Market cap (186.0M × $277.11)	$51.55B
plus net debt ($11.00B − $1.52B)	$9.48B
plus DoW convertible preferred	$1.00B
Enterprise value	~$62.0B

Multiple	Value
EV / EBITDA (TTM $4.00B)	15.5x
EV / EBIT (TTM $2.31B)	26.8x
EV / Sales	2.70x
P / FCF (TTM $2.81B)	18.4x
P / FCF (FY26E $3.0B)	17.2x
FCF yield (FY26E)	5.8%

The FCF yield is the most flattering number on this page and the one a bull should lead with. 5.8% on a 0.75-beta business with a $42B backlog is a defensible starting yield.

4.3 Models

Graham IV — √(22.5 × $9.97 × $112.10) = $158.6

Reported book value is >100% goodwill; on tangible book the model is undefined (negative). Low weight, but do not discard the direction — Graham's $159 against a $277 price is the model correctly reporting that there are no assets underneath. That is information.

Dividend Yield Theory — annualised dividend $5.00 → current yield 1.80% vs 5yr average 1.95% → fair value $256.

Note carefully (per pitfall-dyt-inverts-when-price-caused-the-yield): here the yield rose because price fell and the dividend grew, so DYT is not inverted and is usable. Its message is stark — after a 27% drawdown the shares still yield less than their own five-year average. That is a measure of how expensive the $379 high was.

DDM (Gordon) — D1 $5.25, r 8.5%, g 5% → $150. Very low weight: at a 1.8% yield the dividend is not the thesis. It confirms the payout alone does not support the price.

Bogle expected return —

Component
Dividend yield	+1.8%
Earnings growth	+9% (7% organic revenue + margin + ~1% buyback)
P/E reversion (23.3x → ~19x over 5yr)	−4.0%
Expected annual return	~6.8%

FCF multiple (primary weight) — FY26E FCF $3.0B at a 17–20x defense-prime range → $51–60B equity → $274–323/share.

Adjusted-EPS multiple — $11.90 at 19–23x → $226–274. FY27 $13.46 at 18–21x → $242–283.

4.4 Dividend overlay (dividend grower)


Annualised dividend (2026)	$5.00
Yield	1.80% (5yr avg 1.95%)
FCF payout ratio (TTM)	33%
GAAP EPS payout	49%

Dividend CAGR, and the trend that matters:

Window	CAGR
10yr (2015 $1.94 → 2025 $4.80)	9.5%
5yr (2020 $3.40 → 2025 $4.80)	7.1%
3yr (2022 $4.48 → 2025 $4.80)	2.3%
2026 (annualised $5.00)	4.2%

The dividend is very safe and its growth has decelerated hard. A 33% FCF payout on $3.0B of guided cash flow leaves enormous room — this payout survives a 50% cut to FCF untouched. But 9.5% → 7.1% → 2.3% is not noise; management chose deleveraging and buybacks over dividend growth after Aerojet, and the 2026 step-up to 4.2% only partly reverses it. Do not own this for income — a 1.8% yield growing at 4% is a capital-appreciation thesis with a dividend attached, not an income holding.

4.5 Fair value

Model	Output	Weight
FCF multiple	$274–323	High
Adj-EPS multiple	$226–283	High
DYT	$256	Medium
Bogle	~6.8%/yr return	Medium
Graham	$159	Low
DDM	$150	Very low

Fair value: $245 – $300 · spot $277.11

The cash-flow models cluster at or slightly above spot; the asset- and dividend-based models sit well below and pull the range down. The honest synthesis is that the stock is trading inside its fair-value band, in the upper half. Not overvalued. Not cheap.

Entry zone: $230–250 — 19–21x FY26 adjusted EPS, roughly 6.7% FY26 FCF yield. That is the price at which the balance-sheet and governance risks are paid for rather than assumed away.

Trim: 24x fwd (approximately $323 on current forward consensus) — expressed as a multiple so it tracks earnings. See §8 for the fiscal-year caveat.

5. Debate round — the tension

Fundamentals and Moat disagree with Sentiment about what the drawdown means.

The bull rebuttal: "You are marking down a business whose backlog just hit a record, whose book-to-bill is 1.2x, whose fastest segment grew 14% with $20B of contracts in negotiation, and which raised guidance three weeks ago. The two shocks were an IPO timing decision and one executive's private conduct — neither touched a dollar of earnings. ROIC of 6% is a historical artifact of purchase accounting; the incremental business earns 44% on tangible capital, and incremental returns are what compound. You are penalising a company for a merger that closed in 2019."

The bear rebuttal: "Incremental returns only matter if incremental capital is deployed at them — and this management's demonstrated pattern is to borrow $4B and buy the growth instead. That is precisely how ROIC got to 6%. The IPO delay is not a timing decision; it is the market declining to pay the price management wanted for the one asset that could re-rate the whole company, and management believing the market is wrong. And the stock is at 23.3x — the same multiple as Northrop and General Dynamics, who both earn better returns on better balance sheets."

Resolution — weighted for company type. For a mature, cash-generative defense prime where the moat is not in dispute, the framework weights Fundamentals and Valuation above Moat and Sentiment. Both rebuttals hold on their own terms, and the disagreement is not actually about the facts:

The bull is right that operations are fine and the sell-off is not operational.
The bear is right that operations being fine was already the price — a 6% ROIC company at a 23x multiple with negative tangible book has no margin of safety, and the catalyst that would have created one has been deferred by at least a year.

Both can be true, and they are. That produces WATCH, not a hedge. The stock fell 27% and became fairly valued — it did not become cheap. principle-down-a-lot-is-not-cheap applies exactly.

6. Verdict

WATCH — conviction 5.5 / 10

Fair value $245–300 · spot $277.11 · entry $230–250 · trim 24x fwd

The case for owning it

$42B record backlog, 1.2x book-to-bill, 7% organic growth — visibility most equities cannot offer.
Missile Solutions +14% with a $12B Lockheed THAAD/PAC-3 framework and $20B+ under negotiation. Structurally short capacity in a rearmament cycle.
Margins expanding — 15.4% → 15.8% → guided low-16%.
$3.0B FCF guided, 5.8% FCF yield, 33% FCF payout. The dividend is very safe.
Deleveraging is real — $13.1B → $11.0B, net debt/EBITDA 2.4x.
Axyv IPO is deferred, not cancelled — a live 2027 catalyst with a hard deadline.
Beta 0.75, 89% institutional, 0.02% short interest.

The case against paying today's price

RED FLAG — ROIC 6.2%, at or below cost of capital, third consecutive year. The operating business earns 44% on tangible capital; shareholders get 6% because management paid $26.5B in goodwill and intangibles for it.
RED FLAG — tangible book value is −$30.6/share. No asset floor.
RED FLAG — governance tail unresolved. CEO fired for cause; reporting that concerns were raised years earlier makes this a board-oversight question with litigation risk, and the separation is disputed.
The re-rating catalyst is gone until mid-2027 at the earliest, against a hard 31 Dec 2027 deadline on the DoW $1B convertible preferred.
23.3x FY26 earnings is not a discount — level with NOC/GD, 37% premium to LMT, with the worst returns and balance sheet of the four.
FY2027 budget mechanics. Golden Dome sits on reconciliation money with no FY26 topline fallback; a CR through the midterms hits it directly.
No clean organic multi-year growth series exists — every CAGR spans the L3 merger or Aerojet.

What would move this to ACCUMULATE

Price into $230–250 without thesis damage — the cleanest path.
Axyv IPO re-confirmed with a date and a credible valuation.
ROIC through 8% on two consecutive prints — evidence the roll-up is finally earning its cost of capital.
New CEO commits to no large M&A and to using missile-cycle cash for debt and buybacks.

What would move this to AVOID

Further governance disclosure implicating the board, or a restatement of any kind.
Axyv IPO abandoned, or DoW preferred redemption triggered.
Segment operating margin back below 15%.
Another debt-funded acquisition above $2B.

Recheck: Q3 2026 print, late October — the first quarter under Mehta, the first capital-allocation signal from the new CEO, and the first read on FY2027 budget mechanics.

7. Data integrity — vendor fields that are wrong on this name

Six fields in the standard feed are wrong or mislabelled for LHX. Two of them invert the verdict. Checked against Knowledge/Playbook/pitfall-* before use.

#	Field	Vendor says	Actual	Consequence
1	Forward P/E	20.59	23.3x on FY2026 guidance	Vendor forward EPS ($13.46) is FY2027, not FY2026 ($11.90). Confirms `pitfall-vendor-forward-eps-is-the-wrong-fiscal-year`. Taken raw, LHX screens as the cheapest large prime except LMT. It is not.
2	EV / EBITDA	32.09	15.5x	Yahoo populated the EBITDA field with EBIT. roic.ai's FY25 EV/EBIT is 30.76 against EV/EBITDA of 19.47 — the vendor figure tracks the EBIT series. A 32x EV/EBITDA would make LHX look absurdly expensive for a defense prime. New pitfall candidate.
3	Float	219.82M	186.2M or less	Float exceeds shares outstanding — impossible. Field is stale.
4	Enterprise value	$68.87B	~$62.0B	Overstated ~11%, consistent with the bad float being used for market cap. Computed by hand throughout.
5	Gross margin	30%	25.7% (roic.ai)	430bp discrepancy. Neither is the meaningful figure — the company's adjusted segment operating margin (15.8%) is what management guides and what peers are compared on.
6	Insider "purchases"	10 recent	zero open-market buys	All are director RSU/stock-award grants, several at $0.00. Confirms `pitfall-yahoo-insider-purchases-counts-rsu-grants`. No insider signal exists here — do not read the ouster as insiders buying the dip.

Additional structural traps on this name:

pitfall-divested-segment-corrupts-multiyear-cagr applies. The 3yr CAGRs span the Aerojet acquisition and the commercial-aviation divestiture. Use the 7% organic figure.
Segment comparability breaks at January 2026. Four segments → three. Any segment-level series crossing that date is not like-for-like.
pitfall-roicai-free-plan-caps-history-at-two-years confirmed — roic.ai returned only FY2024–FY2025 annual, and refused quarterly/TTM outright. All TTM figures in this report were built by summing Q3'25–Q2'26 from the statements, not taken from a field.
GAAP vs non-GAAP gap is roughly $2/share, driven by ~$720M/yr of acquired-intangible amortisation (intangibles fell $7.26B → $6.54B over four quarters). Never compare GAAP TTM EPS to a non-GAAP guide.

8. Watchlist note

LHX is not currently in Watchlist.md. On the merits it belongs there — a quality defense franchise, fairly valued, with two identified catalysts and a defined entry band $27–47 below spot.

Suggested entry if added:

Sleeve: 🏛 Evergreen Compounders (sovereign-demand durability, 0.75 beta) — though ⚡ AI & Infrastructure Capex is arguable given the Golden Dome and missile-capacity ramp.
Conviction: [5.5]
Entry: $230–250 · Trim: Trim 24x fwd
Break triggers: Axyv IPO abandoned or DoW preferred redemption triggered · segment operating margin below 15% · further governance disclosure implicating the board · another debt-funded acquisition above $2B.

Trim-multiple caveat. The site computes dollar = mult × (price ÷ forwardPE), and the vendor forwardPE for LHX resolves to FY2027 EPS (~$13.46), not FY2026. 24x fwd therefore renders as ~$323, which is the intended level. Anyone re-setting this trim must re-check which fiscal year the vendor forward EPS refers to at that time — per pitfall-multiple-trim-inherits-the-broken-vendor-field, the multiple silently inherits whatever basis the feed is on.

Sources

Quantitative data: Yahoo Finance (statements, quotes, holders) and roic.ai (ratios, multiples). TTM figures computed from quarterly statements; enterprise value and all multiples computed by hand — see §7 for why the vendor fields were not used.

LHX · Analyze